








DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 






(Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University) 
 
Ryonghun Im 
(Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University) 
 
  Takuma Kunieda 
(School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University) 
 
  Akihisa Shibata 











SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY 
 
1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho 












This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to examine whether fi-
nancial innovations destabilize an economy. Applying a neoclassical production
function, we demonstrate that as financial frictions are mitigated, the economy
loses stability and a flip bifurcation occurs at a certain level of financial frictions
under an empirically plausible elasticity of substitution between capital and la-
bor. Furthermore, the amplitude of fluctuations increases as financial frictions
are mitigated and is maximized when the financial market approaches perfec-
tion. These outcomes imply that financial innovations are likely to destabilize
an economy.
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1 Introduction
The development of modern monetary and financial systems began in the early 17th
century. In the financial development process, unceasing financial innovations have
enabled us to trade tremendous amounts of assets in the financial market. Under these
circumstances, people have repeatedly witnessed large swings of boom-bust fluctua-
tions, which are occasionally accompanied by credit market booms and collapses (see
Boissay et al., 2016). As such, researchers and policymakers often assert that finan-
cial innovations destabilize economies (e.g., Loayza and Ranciere, 2006; Guillaumont
Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2011; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014). The purpose of
this paper is to explore whether financial innovations destabilize an economy by ap-
plying a dynamic general equilibrium model with infinitely lived agents.
In our study, we assume that financial innovations directly mitigate financial fric-
tions that entrepreneurs face. From the perspective of the 21st century, one may
imagine that this kind of financial innovation is caused by financial technology com-
bined with information technology and/or artificial intelligence. In particular, due to
the development of financial technology in recent years, the amount of total debt and
credit in the private sector has ballooned far beyond the scale of gross domestic prod-
uct in some countries. In this paper, we investigate how the mitigation of financial
frictions affects economic fluctuations.
The economy in our model is inhabited by three types of economic agents: firms,
workers, and entrepreneurs. The representative firm produces general goods from cap-
ital and labor with a neoclassical production technology that exhibits positive and
diminishing marginal products and is homogeneous of degree one with respect to both
capital and labor. Workers inelastically supply one unit of labor to the representative
firm to earn wage income in each period. They cannot borrow in the financial mar-
ket, and their subjective discount factor is so small that their borrowing constraints
are always binding. Therefore, they consume all their earnings in each period, i.e.,
they are hand-to-mouth consumers. Entrepreneurs receive idiosyncratic productivity
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shocks in each period. Entrepreneurs who draw higher productivity shocks borrow in
the financial market and undertake an investment project to produce capital. Those
who draw lower productivity shocks store their wealth by lending in the financial mar-
ket without engaging in an investment project. Because of idiosyncratic productivity
shocks, investors and lenders appear endogenously in each period. Entrepreneurs
face financial frictions, and they can borrow only up to a certain proportion of their
net wealth. The mitigation of financial frictions promotes capital accumulation be-
cause the allocation of production resources is improved, and thus macroeconomic
productivity increases.
The increase in the capital stock has two conflicting effects on capital income.
On the one hand, it places upward pressure on capital income because the source
of capital income (i.e., the principal) becomes greater. On the other hand, it places
downward pressure on capital income because the decrease in the marginal product
of capital lowers the interest rate. Therefore, the increase in the capital stock does
not necessarily raise capital income. In this paper, we assume that the elasticity of
the marginal product of capital in the production technology increases as the capital
stock increases. In this case, at the early stage of capital accumulation, the positive
effect of the increase in the capital stock on capital income surpasses the negative
effect, whereas the negative effect becomes stronger than the positive effect as capital
accumulates. Then, capital income increases at the early stage of capital accumulation
and starts to decline when capital accumulation attains a certain threshold level. In
other words, the net effect that capital accumulation has on capital income has an
inverted-U shape. In our model, this inverted-U shaped effect of capital accumulation
on capital income is crucial to producing endogenous business cycles.
To study how the mitigation of financial frictions affects economic fluctuations,
we produce bifurcation diagrams with respect to the extent of financial frictions.
Our findings are as follows. Under an empirically plausible elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor, as financial frictions are mitigated, the economy loses
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stability, and a flip bifurcation occurs at a certain level of financial frictions. Fur-
thermore, the amplitude of business fluctuations increases as financial frictions are
mitigated and is maximized when the financial market approaches perfection. There-
fore, financial innovations are likely to destabilize the economy.
The current paper is related to the literature on (deterministic) endogenous busi-
ness cycles in the dynamic general equilibrium model, which have been theoretically
studied by many researchers over the past thirty years and the plausibility of which
has recently been empirically supported by Beaudry et al. (2015, 2017, 2020). Exam-
ples of works that employ the overlapping generations model are Benhabib and Day
(1982), Grandmont (1985), Farmer (1986), Reichlin (1986), Benhabib and Laroque
(1988), Bertocchi and Wang (1995), Grandmont et al. (1998), and Rochon and Pole-
marchakis (2006). Whereas the models in all these works include outside money,
Yokoo (2000) demonstrates that endogenous business cycles can occur in an overlap-
ping generations model without outside money, with the elasticity of the marginal
product of capital playing a crucial role in the occurrence of endogenous business
cycles, as in our model. Unlike Yokoo’s model, our model is inhabited by infinitely
lived agents, and we investigate the destabilization of an economy caused by finan-
cial innovations. Benhabib and Nishimura (1985), Boldrin and Denecker (1990), and
Nishimura and Yano (1995) employ an infinitely lived agent model in which endoge-
nous business cycles are derived in an economy with two production sectors.
None of the abovementioned studies, however, explicitly consider financial fric-
tions. Examples of papers that derive endogenous business cycles with financial fric-
tions are Azariadis and Smith (1996, 1998), Favara (2012), Gokan (2011), Kikuchi
(2008), Kikuchi and Stachurski (2009), Matsuyama (2007, 2013), Matsuyama et al.
(2016), and Myerson (2012, 2014). All these studies employ the overlapping genera-
tions model. In contrast, Woodford (1989) constructs a dynamic general equilibrium
model of infinitely lived capitalists and workers and derives endogenous business cy-
cles. In his model, workers consume in a hand-to-mouth manner, not being allowed
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to borrow and lend in the financial market, and capitalists are homogeneous, so that
neither borrowing nor lending occurs among them. Although hand-to-mouth workers
are also assumed in our model, entrepreneurs can borrow up to the limit of borrowing
constraints as previously explained. In our model, the extent of financial frictions
plays a crucial role in the instability of the economy. Aghion et al. (2004) and Pintus
(2011) also derive endogenous business cycles in a model of infinitely lived agents with
financial frictions, but they assume a small open economy where the world interest
rate is exogenously given.1 Although Kunieda and Shibata (2017) investigate how
financial development affects endogenous business cycles in a dynamic general equi-
librium model of infinitely lived agents, their economy does not exhibit endogenous
business cycles when the financial market approaches perfection. To the best of our
knowledge, no studies in the existing literature obtain the result that the amplitude
of endogenous business cycles increases as the financial market approaches perfection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we
develop the model and obtain the optimality conditions of entrepreneurs, workers, and
the representative firm. Section 3 derives an equilibrium in which a one-dimensional
dynamical system with respect to capital is obtained. In section 4, we investigate the
patterns of dynamic behaviors in the economy and observe the appearance of endoge-
nous business cycles. In section 5, we find that the mitigation of financial frictions
destabilizes the economy. In this section, we also produce bifurcation diagrams with
respect to the extent of financial frictions. In section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 The model
A closed economy continues from period 0 to +∞ in discrete time indexed by t. Al-
though the basic setting of financial frictions is similar to that of Kunieda and Shibata
1Orgiazzi (2008) also investigates endogenous business cycles in a small open economy, extending
the model of Aghion et al. (2004), and demonstrates that the labor share plays an important role
in causing instability in the model of Aghion et al. (2004).
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(2016), in which there are only entrepreneurs as active agents, it differs from their
model in that the economy in our model consists of a continuum of entrepreneurs,
identical workers, and a representative firm. The population of entrepreneurs is nor-
malized to one, and that of workers is normalized to N . All these economic agents
are infinitely lived. The representative firm produces general goods from capital and
labor. Entrepreneurs are potential capital producers: in each period, those who draw
higher productivity shocks become capital producers (investors), and those who draw
lower productivity shocks become lenders.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
2.1.1 Timing of events
Consider the timing of events that a certain entrepreneur, say, entrepreneur j ∈ X
experiences from period t to period t+ 1, where X is the entire set of entrepreneurs.
At the beginning of period t, entrepreneur j has not yet received an idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock for capital production. The consumption good market in period t is
opened at the beginning of the period and closed before an idiosyncratic productivity
shock is realized. Therefore, entrepreneur j makes a decision about consumption and
saving at the beginning of period t without knowing her productivity.
At the end of period t, there are two saving methods that entrepreneur j can
apply: one is lending her savings in the financial market, and the other is initiating
an investment project. Because an idiosyncratic productivity shock is realized before
entrepreneur j determines her saving method, she optimally chooses between these
saving methods while knowing her productivity. Lending one unit of savings in the
financial market in period t yields a claim to rt+1 units of general goods in period
t+1, where rt+1 is the gross real interest rate. Investing one unit of funds in a project
in period t yields Φjt units of capital in period t+1, which is sold to the representative
firm at a price ρt+1. In other words, entrepreneur j is endowed with an investment




t , where k
j
t+1 represents capital to be used for
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general goods production in period t + 1, ijt is an investment, and Φ
j
t is individual-
specific productivity in capital production. Although Φjt is an idiosyncratic shock,
the realization of low productivity cannot be insured against because no insurance
market for idiosyncratic productivity shocks exists. We assume that Φj0,Φ
j
1, ... are
independent and identically distributed both over time and across entrepreneurs (the
i.i.d assumption), and its cumulative distribution function is given by G(Φj) the
support of which is given by [l,m] where l, m∈ R+ ∪ {+∞}. G(Φj) is differentiable
and strictly increasing on the support.
2.1.2 Maximization problem
Entrepreneur j in period t maximizes the following expected lifetime utility:







where β ∈ (0, 1) is her subjective discount factor and cjτ is consumption in period τ .









τ−1)− cjτ for τ ≥ t, (1)
where djτ is lending if positive and borrowing if negative. In period t = 0, the flow
budget constraint is given by ij0 + d
j
0 = ρ0k0 − c
j
0, where k0 is the initial capital
endowment at birth and is common to all entrepreneurs.
In borrowing in the financial market, entrepreneur j faces a financial constraint,
which is given by
djτ ≥ −λajτ ,






τ−1) − cjτ for τ ≥ 1 (or a
j
0 := ρ0k0 − c
j
0 for period
τ = 0) represents her savings.2 Henceforth, we call ajt entrepreneur j’s net worth.
2Similar financial constraints are assumed in the literature (e.g., Aghion et al., 1999; Aghion and
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Note that λ ∈ (0,∞) measures the extent of financial frictions: as λ increases because
of financial innovations, the financial constraint is relaxed. The financial constraint
disables entrepreneur j from borrowing from the financial market more than λ times




τ , the financial
constraint is rewritten as
djτ ≥ −µijτ , (2)
where µ := λ/(1 + λ) ∈ (0, 1) also measures the extent of financial frictions. It is
necessary to impose the nonnegativity constraint of investment as follows:
ijτ ≥ 0. (3)
Entrepreneur j maximizes her expected lifetime utility U jt subject to Eqs. (1)-(3).
2.1.3 Optimal portfolio allocation
To consider an optimal portfolio allocation of entrepreneurs j’s net worth, we define
φt := rt+1/ρt+1. (4)
If entrepreneur j draws her productivity such that Φjt > φt, she becomes an investor.
She optimally initiates an investment project with borrowing up to the limit of the
financial constraint. If she draws her productivity such that Φjt ≤ φt, she lends her
entire net worth in the financial market to acquire the gross return rt+1.
3 Hence, φt
is the cutoff of the productivity shocks that divides entrepreneurs into investors and
lenders in period t. Then, entrepreneur j’s optimal portfolio program is given by
ijt =








Banerjee, 2005; Aghion et al., 2005; Antras and Caballero, 2009).

















By defining Rjτ := max{rτ , (ρτΦ
j
τ−1 − rτµ)/(1 − µ)} and from Eqs. (5) and (6), we





τ−1 − cjτ . (7)












Workers in our model are identical, being endowed with one unit of labor in each
period, and supply their labor to the production sector inelastically to earn wage
income. It is assumed that workers are hand-to-mouth consumers; that is, they
entirely consume their current labor income. Consider a certain worker, say, worker
h. Worker h’s consumption program can be given by
cht = wt, (9)
for all t ≥ 0, where cht is worker h’s consumption.4




workers’ subjective discount factor is so small that β̃ < 1/rt for all t ≥ 0 in equilibrium and workers
cannot borrow in the financial market. Then, workers consume all their labor income in each period.




The representative firm produces general goods with a production technology given by
Yt = F (Kt, Nt), where Kt and Nt represent capital and labor in period t, respectively.
Capital depreciates entirely in one period. F (·, ·) is continuous and at least twice
differentiable with respect to Kt and Nt. It is assumed that limKt→0 F (Kt, Nt) =
limNt→0 F (Kt, Nt) = 0. The production technology exhibits positive and diminishing
marginal products and constant returns to scale with respect to Kt and Nt. We define
f(kt) := F (Kt/Nt, 1) where kt := Kt/Nt is per worker capital. Then, it holds that
f ′(kt) > 0 > f
′′(kt) with limkt→0 f(kt) = 0.




wt = f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt. (11)
The elasticity of the marginal product of capital is defined as follows:
η(kt) := −f ′′(kt)kt/f ′(kt) > 0. (12)
For the sake of the following analysis, we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that εt := −(dNt/dwt) · (wt/Nt) is the elasticity of demand for










Proof. See the Appendix.
Eq. (13) expresses the relationship among wage, capital income, the elasticity of the
marginal product of capital and the elasticity of demand for labor.
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3 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is given by sequences of prices {wt, ρt, rt+1} for all t ≥ 0






t} for all j and t ≥ 0, {cht } for all h and t ≥ 0, and {kt}
for all t ≥ 0, such that (i) for each j, entrepreneur j maximizes her lifetime utility
from each period t onward; (ii) for each h, worker h consumes so that cht = wt in
each period; (iii) the representative firm maximizes its profits in each period; and (iv)
the financial market (in section 3.2), the capital market (in section 3.3), the general
goods market, and the labor market (Nt = N) all clear.










t+1]− 1. Substituting the






t+1] + β. From this














it follows that ajt/c
j







3.1 Aggregate net worth
Define Ξt =
{
j ∈ X : Φjt ≤ φt
}
. Then, Ξt is the set of entrepreneurs who draw
individual-specific productivity shocks such that Φjt ≤ φt in period t. From Eq.























t−1dj is the total
capital used for general goods production. Therefore, the aggregate net worth across
all entrepreneurs is obtained as follows:
At = βρtKt. (16)
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3.2 Financial market clearing condition
The financial market clearing condition is given by
∫
j∈X
djtdj = 0. (17)








ajtdj = 0. (18)


















ajtdj = (1−G(φt))At, (20)





dG(Φjt) = G(φt) for the second equalities in Eqs.




At = 0. (21)
Eq. (21) yields G(φ∗) = µ, from which an equilibrium cutoff can be uniquely deter-
mined as follows:
φ∗ = G−1(µ) =: φ∗(µ). (22)
Lemma 2 below shows that φ∗ strictly increases with µ.
Lemma 2. dφ∗(µ)/dµ > 0.
Proof. G(·) is differentiable and strictly increasing, and µ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, φ∗ is
uniquely determined and strictly increases with µ.
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3.3 Capital market clearing condition






































t). One can demonstrate that limµ→1H(φ
∗)/(1−µ) =
m by applying L’Hopital’s rule and the inverse function theorem with Eq. (22),
provided that m (which is the highest productivity) is a finite value. Therefore, the
economy is well defined when the financial market approaches perfection. In this
case, aggregate saving in the economy is used by the most productive entrepreneurs
for capital production.
4 Dynamics
Dividing both sides of Eq. (25) by N and inserting Eqs. (10) and (22) into the
resulting equation, we obtain a dynamic equation of per worker capital as follows:
kt+1 = Ω(µ)f
′(kt)kt =: Ψ(kt;µ), (26)
where Ω(µ) := βH(φ∗(µ))/(1− µ).
Lemma 3. ∂Ω(µ)/∂µ > 0.
13
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Eq. (26) and Lemma 3, it follows that ∂Ψ(kt;µ)/∂µ > 0. This implies that
the configuration of Eq. (26) shifts up as financial frictions are mitigated. This is
because as financial frictions are mitigated, low-productivity entrepreneurs are ruled
out of capital production, and thus, productivity in the economy as a whole becomes
high.
4.1 Steady state
Suppose that k∗ is the nontrivial steady-state value of capital. From Eq. (26), k∗
satisfies the following equation:
1 = Ω(µ)f ′(k∗). (27)
Assuming the existence of the nontrivial steady-state value of capital for any µ∈ (0, 1),
one notes from Eq. (27) that k∗ has a one-to-one relationship with µ because of
Lemma 3 and can be written in terms of µ as k∗ = f ′−1 (1/Ω(µ)) =: k∗(µ). In
particular, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The steady-state value of per worker capital strictly increases as
financial frictions are mitigated, i.e., ∂k∗(µ)/∂µ > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The mitigation of financial frictions promotes the accumulation of capital stock in the
steady state because productivity in the economy becomes high and output increases
as financial frictions are mitigated.
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4.2 Dynamic patterns
In this subsection, we investigate the dynamic behavior of the capital stock that is
characterized by Eq. (26). From Eq. (26), it follows that
Ψ′(kt;µ) = Ω(µ)[f
′(kt)kt]
′ = Ω(µ)f ′(kt)[1− η(kt)], (28)
where η(kt) is the elasticity of the marginal product defined by (12). We prepare
the following assumption with respect to η(kt) to explore the case in which we are
interested.
Assumption 1. η′(kt) > 0, limkt→0 η(kt) < 1, and limkt→∞ η(kt) > 2.
Under Assumption 1, there exist unique values of k̂ and k̃ in (0,∞) such that η(k̂) = 1
and η(k̃) = 2. Then, it follows that
η(kt)

∈ (0, 1] for 0 < kt ≤ k̂
∈ (1, 2] for k̂ < kt ≤ k̃
∈ (2,∞) for k̃ < kt.
(29)
Assumption 1 implies that the elasticity of the marginal product strictly increases with
per worker capital. This assumption holds with a production function exhibiting a






some parameter conditions, which is used for the numerical analysis in section 5.2.
4.2.1 Local dynamics
Eq. (26) can be linearized in the neighborhood of the steady state as kt+1 − k∗ =
Ψ′(k∗;µ)(kt − k∗), which can be rewritten as
kt+1 − k∗ = [1− η(k∗)](kt − k∗) (30)
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by using Eqs. (27) and (28). The local stability in the neighborhood of the steady
state immediately follows from Eqs. (29) and (30), as summarized in Proposition 2
below.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, if 0 < k∗ < k̃, the steady
state of Eq. (26) is stable, and if k∗ > k̃, the steady state of Eq. (26) is unstable.
Proof. From Eqs. (29) and (30), it follows that |1 − η(k∗)| < 1 if 0 < k∗ < k̃, and
1− η(k∗) < −1 if k∗ > k̃. Then, the claims hold.
4.2.2 Global dynamics
The configuration of Ψ(kt;µ) depends upon the sign of Ψ
′(kt;µ) with µ given. Since
the sign of Ψ′(kt;µ) is the same as that of 1 − η(kt), as seen in Eq. (28), we have a
lemma regarding the configuration of Ψ(kt) below.
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, Ψ(·;µ) is a single-peaked map-
ping; i.e., Ψ(kt;µ) increases with kt ∈ (0, k̂) and decreases with kt ∈ (k̂,∞).
Proof. Since the sign of Ψ′(kt;µ) is the same as that of 1 − η(kt), if 0 < kt < k̂, it
holds that Ψ′(kt;µ) > 0, and if kt > k̂, it holds that Ψ
′(kt;µ) < 0, which leads to a
desired conclusion.
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To discuss the global dynamics of Eq. (26), we draw typical configurations of Eq.
(26) in Figure 1. As seen in Panel A, if the steady-state capital k∗ is smaller than k̂,
it holds that 0 < 1−η(k∗) < 1. In this case, the economy monotonically converges to
the steady state if k0 < k
∗. If the steady-state capital k∗ is greater than k̂ and smaller
than k̃, the steady state is stable and converges to the steady state with oscillation,
as seen in Panel B. If the steady-state capital stock k∗ is greater than k̃, the steady
state is unstable, as seen in Panel C, and the economy exhibits endogenous business
cycles.
5 Financial destabilization
In this section, we demonstrate that financial innovations can destabilize the economy.
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5.1 Bifurcation
The steady-state capital stock k∗ increases with µ, as see in Proposition 1, whereas
k̃ does not vary with µ. To investigate bifurcations, the following assumption is
imposed:
Assumption 2. limµ→0 k
∗(µ) < k̃ < limµ→1 k
∗(µ).





σ satisfies Assumption 2 under some
parameter conditions. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a unique µ̃ in (0, 1)
such that k∗(µ̃) = k̃. Then, we obtain Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Suppose also that µ in-
creases from 0 to 1. Then, a flip bifurcation occurs in the steady state at µ = µ̃.
Proof. Since η(k∗(µ̃)) = 2, it follows that 1− η(k∗(µ̃)) = −1, and from Proposition 1
and Assumption 1, we have ∂(1− η(k∗(µ̃))/∂µ = −η′(k∗(µ̃))(∂k∗(µ̃)/∂µ) < 0. Then,
a flip bifurcation occurs at µ = µ̃.
The intuition regarding the occurrence of the flip bifurcation is as follows. If
entrepreneurs earn higher income than that in the steady state, they invest more
than the amount in the steady state. Then, the increased capital has two conflicting
effects on capital income ρtkt. On the one hand, the increase in kt places upward
pressure on capital income because the source of capital income becomes greater.
On the other hand, the increase in kt decreases the marginal product of capital ρt,
which has negative impacts on capital income. When the negative effect dominates
the positive one, the larger investment yields a very low return on capital income
in the next period. Because of lower earnings, entrepreneurs now invest less than
the amount in the steady state, and thus earn more than in the steady state in the
next period. These fluctuations around the steady state become unstable as financial
frictions are mitigated. One notes that when µ < µ̃, the steady state is stable, and
the economy converges to the steady state. As µ increases from 0 to 1, Ψ(kt;µ)
shifts up; as seen in Figure 2, a flip bifurcation occurs in the steady state, and the
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economy loses stability when µ = µ̃. If µ becomes greater than µ̃, or equivalently,
if η(k∗) > 2, the steady state becomes locally unstable, and the economy exhibits
endogenous business cycles, as illustrated in Panel C in Figure 1. This means that
financial innovations can destabilize the economy.
The condition for the steady state to become locally unstable can be rewritten in
terms of labor and capital income and the elasticity of labor demand by using Lemma









where ε̃ is the value of εt evaluated at kt = k̃. The condition derived in Woodford
(1989) for local instability of the steady state can be reduced to Eq. (31) provided that
labor is inelastically supplied in his model. In contrast to our model, both capitalists
and workers are identical in his model, and thus, neither borrowing nor lending occurs
between the two groups and within each group. The distinctive features in our model
relative to Woodford’s model are the heterogeneity in entrepreneurs’ productivity and
the financial friction that they face. The heterogeneity in entrepreneurs’ productivity
yields the situation in which borrowing and lending occur among entrepreneurs and
the financial friction allows us to investigate how the mitigation of financial frictions
destabilizes the economy.
5.2 Numerical analysis
This subsection provides a numerical example. We produce bifurcation diagrams with
respect to µ to examine how the mitigation of financial frictions affects qualitative
characteristics of dynamic behaviors in the economy.
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5.2.1 Specification and parameterization
The functional form of the production technology is specified as






which exhibits a constant elasticity of substitution. F (Kt, N) can be rewritten as a
per worker production function as follows:





where γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, 1) and γ1 + γ2 = 1. From Eq. (32), we have the elasticity of the












We focus on the case in which σ > 0, so that Assumption 1 can hold and limKt→0 F (Kt, N) =
limN→0 F (Kt, N) = limkt→0 f(kt) = 0 can hold. In this case, k̂ can be computed as
k̂ = [γ2/(σγ1)]
1
σ , and k̃ can be computed as k̃ = [2γ2/(γ1(σ − 1))]
1
σ only when σ > 1,
where, as previously defined, k̂ and k̃ satisfy η(k̂) = 1 and η(k̃) = 2, respectively.




σ , the dynamic equation for kt is
obtained as







In Eq. (34), one notes that Ψ(0;µ) = 0 for kt = 0 and Ψ(kt;µ) > 0 for kt > 0. It











]≥ 0 for kt ≤ k̂< 0 for kt > k̂, (35)
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which implies that Ψ(kt;µ) increases with kt ∈ (0, k̂) and decreases with kt ∈ (k̂,∞).
Thus, Ψ(·;µ) is a single-peaked mapping. We impose a parameter condition such that
Ω(φ∗)γ
−1/σ
2 > 1 can hold. Under this parameter condition, Eq. (34) has a nontrivial
steady state, k∗, because Ψ′(0) > 1⇐⇒ Ω(φ∗)γ−1/σ2 > 1.
It is assumed that Φjt follows a uniform distribution over [0,m]. Therefore, we have
G(φ) = φ/m and H(φ) = (m2 − φ2)/(2m).5 Under the assumption of the uniform
distribution, the productivity cutoff is given by
φ∗ = µm. (36)
In the numerical analysis, bifurcation diagrams are produced by varying µ. We set
β = 0.96 following standard real business cycles theory and γ1 = 0.67 and γ2 = 0.33
taking into account the standard income share ratio between labor and capital. We set
a relatively large value for m, that is, m = 10. In this case, the average productivity
of entrepreneurs is equal to H(0) = 5. Under these parameter settings, we examine
the three cases of σ = 1, 1.46 and 2.5.6
5.2.2 Bifurcation diagrams
The bifurcation diagrams in Figure 3 depict the effects that financial constraints have
on the dynamics of capital in equilibrium.
Recent empirical studies report that the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor takes a value from 0.4 to 0.6 (e.g., Klump et al., 2007; Chirinko, 2008;
León-Ledesma et al., 2010). Then, we examine three cases in which the elasticity of
substitution is approximately equal to 0.50, 0.41, and 0.29. As seen in the figure, when
σ = 1 (the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 1/(1 + σ) = 0.50),
the economy monotonically converges to a steady state for any value of µ because the
5In the Appendix, we also examine the case in which Φjt follows a Pareto distribution for a
robustness check and obtain a similar result to that obtained from the uniform distribution.
6Under these parameter settings, it holds that Ω(φ∗)γ
−1/σ
2 > 1 for σ = 1, 1.46 and 2.5 and
µ ∈ (0, 1), and thus, Eq. (34) has a nontrivial steady state, k∗.
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steady state of Eq. (34) is stable. The capital stock in the steady state increases as µ
increases because the mitigation of financial frictions promotes capital accumulation.
When σ = 1.46 (the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is equal to
1/(1 + σ) ≈ 0.41), a flip bifurcation occurs at a certain value of µ and a period-
two cycle arises. One notes that as µ increases, the amplitude of the period-two
cycle increases. When σ = 2.5 (the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor 1/(1 + σ) ≈ 0.29), complex dynamic behaviors are obtained. In this case,
whereas smaller values of µ produce a period-four cycle, period-doubling bifurcations
repeatedly occur as µ increases. Eventually, greater values of µ produce complex
dynamics in the economy. As in the case of σ = 1.46, the amplitude of fluctuations
increases as µ increases.
In summary, in the case in which endogenous business cycles occur, the amplitude
of fluctuations increases, and this amplitude is maximized when the financial market
approaches perfection. This outcome implies that the mitigation of financial frictions
is likely to destabilize the economy.
6 Conclusion
Do financial innovations destabilize economies? Many researchers and policymakers
have argued that financial innovations destabilize economies. To address this issue, we
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have developed a simple dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions.
Applying the production function in which the elasticity of the marginal product
of capital increases as capital accumulates, we investigate the characteristics of the
dynamic behavior of the economy. According to recent empirical studies, the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor ranges from 0.4 to 0.6. Our numerical
analysis shows that when it is 0.41, a flip bifurcation occurs at an intermediate extent
of financial frictions, and a period-two cycle arises. Furthermore, our analysis shows
that as financial frictions are mitigated, the amplitude of the cycle increases. These
outcomes imply that financial innovations can destabilize economies. Our model can
be extended to introduce intrinsically useless assets. The investigation into how the
presence of such assets changes the destabilization property is left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1



































Proof of Lemma 3




















In Eq. (A.2), it holds that H(φ∗) − φ∗(1 − G(φ∗)) > 0. Therefore, ∂Ω(φ∗)/∂µ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
From Eq. (27), it follows that
ln Ω(µ) = − ln f ′(k∗). (A.3)





























In Eq. (A.4), it follows from Lemma 3 that ∂Ω(µ)/∂µ > 0. Therefore, ∂k∗(µ)/∂µ > 0.
Bifurcation diagrams in the case of the Pareto distribution








if α < φ
0 if φ ≤ α,
where α > 0 and n ≥ 2. Then, we have H(φ) = φ[1 − G(φ)]n/(n − 1). It is





To produce bifurcation diagrams, we set α = 1 and n = 2 with other parameter
values remaining the same as those in subsection 5.3. From Eq. (A.5), we obtain
Ω(φ∗) = βH(φ∗(µ))/(1−µ) = αn/[(1−µ) 12 (n−1)]. As seen in this equation, Ω(φ∗) is
not well defined when µ→ 1 because m is not finite in the case of Pareto distributions.
Then, we impose the upper limit of µ at µ = 0.99 when producing the bifurcation
diagrams. Figure A shows the effects of financial constraints on the dynamic behavior
of capital. The results are basically the same as those of the uniform distribution.
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